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2 September 1959

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon with Senator Jackson and Staff on 1 September 1959

1. Besides the Senator and myself there were present Dorothy Fiedick, Robert Tufts and Kenneth Mansfield.

2. The discussion was completely informal and hence rather disorganized. Senator Jackson and associates made it clear that no memoranda were being prepared of these informal luncheons and that there would be no attribution in any manner whatsoever of ideas to individuals offering them at such occasion.

3. The Agency's role was covered in some detail with particular emphasis on the Director's briefings, the kind of topics they covered, and the use made of them. I stressed the point that this was a vast improvement over the situation prevailing in the previous administration when the DDI had briefed the President alone. I also stated that from time to time informal discussions took place on the implications of the intelligence aduced by the Director.

4. There was considerable interest in the Agency's role in suggesting policy choices and opportunities and I took pains to set forth the Director's philosophy, which I shared and abided by, of staying out of policy arguments in order that there would be no reluctance to accept the objectivity of the intelligence presented. Pressed on this point in a friendly manner because, as Jackson stated, the Agency possessed such a unique collection of brainy people, I described at some length the cordial relations existing between the NSC's division chiefs and their corresponding State assistant secretaries and the similar relationships on down the line and suggested that the views of our action elements were thus always available to the policy makers in State and, as appropriate, Defense. I stressed that those on the NSC side of the house, as pure evaluators with no action responsibilities, should and did discipline themselves to avoid policy recommendations. I did, however, point out that my personal relationships with Bob Bowie and Gerry Smith had been such that I was from time to time called upon to comment on policy ideas in the initial stages of their formulation. I also pointed out that it was the duty of intelligence advisers at all levels to call attention to consequences of suggested courses of action insofar as intelligence logically indicated them, so that there was in fact a difference

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between avoiding espousing a course of action and remaining silent during its discussion.

5. Senator Jackson and his colleagues seemed to be particularly interested in how the Council dealt with the major question, "how much of the national resources should and could be devoted to national security ends?" They were well aware that under both administrations the decision setting the aggregate military budget was not processed through the regular Council machinery and sought my opinion as to whether it would not be wise to do so. I admitted that I personally thought the drafters of the 1947 Act had had this in mind but doubted that the result would be much affected by a change in procedures. This led to a discussion of the role of the Council of Economic Advisers in determining just how much the US could afford for security. I pointed out that under this administration at least the CEA had actively participated with the Planning Board and the National Security Council in the annual review of basic national policy and stated that Burns and Saulnier had both been quite independent in expressing their views. Jackson wondered whether it wouldn't be a good idea to amend the law to require a formal report by the Council of Economic Advisers on this topic as well as on the general state of the domestic economy. I said I really hadn't thought about this and felt I was in no position to offer a view.

6. The subject then shifted to the role of Treasury and Budget and I expressed the opinion that they certainly belonged in the machinery and should play a primary role in decisions as to aggregate levels of security programs but went on to say that the problem I saw there was not whether these particular agencies should participate in discussions of all the detailed paragraphs of each policy so much as it was one of streamlining PB's operations so that papers could be processed more rapidly. I suggested that the system used in the early 1950's of having a Steering Group, consisting of State, Defense, JCS and CIA constitute the initial body to debate and refine a draft had much to recommend it. I conceded the need for a final review of the paper by the full membership of the PB provided the representatives of the departments and agencies not primarily concerned with overseas affairs confine their participation to points of appropriate interest to their organizations.

7. The next topic raised was whether it would be desirable to beef up the staff of the Special Assistant so that he could be in a position on his own initiative to offer clear-cut policy recommendations that were not watered down by compromises in interdepartmental negotiations. I took strong exception to this on the ground that the President would not be well-served by having a policy rival to Secretaries of State and Defense. I stated that in my opinion the

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role of the Special Assistant was to see that a policy statement adequately covered the problem as presented by intelligence and to see that policy issues were clearly and sharply defined and limited to matters of sufficient importance to justify the time of senior officials of Government. I stated that I thought Bobby Cutler had set an extremely high standard in this regard and had earned the respect of all concerned by his refusal to take sides in debates. I also paid tribute to Gordon Gray along the same lines.

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8. Asked if I had any other ideas that I would put into effect "if I were King," I replied that generally speaking I thought the machinery had developed well and should not be radically altered. I stated that to the extent I was familiar with it, the manner of the procedure of the Council itself was first-class and that I would concentrate my efforts on trying to see that matters brought before it were more topical and more current than was sometimes the case. I stated that the annual exercise on basic policy was pretty much as it ought to be but much time could be saved by avoiding discursive essay-type papers on regions and countries. These I felt could better be condensed into sort of a loose leaf form with content confined to precise objectives and specific courses of action. If this were done, the Council's activities would be concentrated on specific matters and issues requiring change because of developments in the world and they would get a chance to cycle the entire policy book through the machinery more often than once an administration, which has been the case to date.

9. Finally, there was a discussion of the desirability of contingency policy making, e.g., was it worth while to decide what we would do under certain circumstances when it was impossible to foresee all the factors that would have to be taken into account in the actual event. I expressed strongly the view that this was in fact desirable because any Government should take time when it had it to decide deliberately what it should do in the event of certain selected foreseeable contingencies rather than wait till the crisis was at hand and a decision very likely required in a matter of hours if not minutes. Of course, a prestocked decision would not automatically be invoked but it should be helpful in a meeting such as that at Blair House on June 25, 1950 to have as a starting point a paper analyzing the importance of South Korea and the effect of defending it or refusing to do so.

10. Senator Jackson stated that hearings would not start

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until February and that he did not expect that formal hearings would play a very large role in his deliberations. He stressed his desire to be constructive and practical and hoped that his group would be wise enough to avoid "slick solutions" and recommendations that would upset adequately functioning machinery.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	3 Sept. 59
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221	East		
REMARKS:			
<p><i>Sachs</i> <i>on Mr. Polley</i> <i>on Mr. Manning</i></p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p>			
FROM: O/DD/I			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
354	Admin		
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	

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**Excerpt from the Journal**

**Office of the Legislative Counsel**

**Friday - 21 August 1959**

Ed McCabe from the White House telephoned stating he was preparing a list of points of contact in various agencies for the purposes of the Jackson Subcommittee study and inquired if my name should be on the list for CIA. I stated this was correct. I advised McCabe that the Director had specifically requested me to furnish McCabe a detailed memorandum for the record which I had prepared of the Director's meeting with Senator Jackson on 13 August 1959. McCabe stated that since I had reported on this meeting at the Planning Board on 14 August at which McCabe was present, he did not wish a copy of the memorandum. He further stated he did not wish a flood of paper on this subject but merely wished to be kept abreast of significant developments. He stated he planned to have a further meeting with the "department points of contact" in the near future.

SIGNED

**JOHN S. WARNER**  
**Legislative Counsel**

cc: DCI  
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